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This paper reviews (critically and selectively) the literature on the link between 
economic development, the environment and international trade (and capital 
flows). In particular, how stricter environmental regulation in the North affects 
trade and capital movements between the North and the South. It also discusses 

































About half a century has elapsed since the process of decolonization gathered 
steam. Since then the newly independent developing countries have been 
looking for ways that would enable them to close the yawning gap in their 
standard of living with those of the developed countries. At that time, economists 
(nearly unanimously) felt that these countries needed to save more and 
accumulate capital to close this gap. There were those who believed that 
industrialization should be an inward-looking process, while others favoured 
integration with the world economy. In the early stages of the debate, with an 
emphasis on growth models, environmental issues were totally disregarded-- 
indeed as late as 1991 a very influential survey on development economics and 
public policy is resoundingly silent on the topic of environmental degradation.
1 
Only in the last decade or so there is a grudging acknowledgement that 
environmental considerations need to be addressed when discussing growth 
issues.   
  
Where such environmental considerations are entertained, output is assumed to 
be produced using the available technology and factors like labour, reproducible 
factors (like capital) and natural resources. Production thus uses renewable and 
non-renewable natural resources. The former e.g., flora and fauna, grow through 
natural reproduction. The latter e.g., fossil fuels and metal deposits, do not. 
Production and/or consumption uses up natural resources, while at the same 
time changing the characteristics of other life-sustaining elements like air, water 
etc. The environmental input consists of the damage to these through pollution 
and the degradation of the renewable resource stock, e.g., land, the habitat of 
wild-life etc. As should be obvious from this outline, an analysis of these issues 
would involve many disciplines beside economics, e.g., ecology, geology etc.   
  
                                                 
1 See Stern (1991a). Also see the companion piece on economic growth (Stern (1991b)) where, again, there 
is no discussion of the environment. 
  1Economists do occasionally stray into the territory of these other disciplines (and 
not always to conduct multi-disciplinary analysis!). This happened following the 
first big oil price shock in the mid-1970s when there was an animated discussion 
on the substitution possibilities between natural resources (especially exhaustible 
resources) and other inputs and whether the growth process itself was without 
limit A major strand in this debate revolved around the question as to whether 
changes in technology can substitute for natural resource inputs especially non-
renewable ones
2. While we do not know what the future holds, in the recent past 
it is actually the case that energy use has grown much slower than output 
growth—e.g., between 1960 and 2000, energy use in the US, the EU and Japan 




The notion of “sustainable development” or “intergenerational equity” tries to 
come to grips with the dilemma posed as to how to raise current living standards 
while, at the same time, ensuring that the environmental consequences are “not 
too” damaging i.e., it should not affect adversely the availability of the natural 
capital that is left for the future generations.
4 For this we need make operational 
the concept of a stock of environmental or natural capital, since we are interested 
in tracking the path of such a variable over time. Any precise operational 
definition of the concept of sustainability has proved elusive. The reasons are not 
far to seek—we need preferences to be defined over a very long (possibly 
infinite) horizon, a catalogue of possible new products and how technical 
progress, population size, etc will evolve over time. The issue of sustainability 
has popped up even in the context of the (mainly theoretical) endogenous growth 
literature with some seeing growth ultimately petering out as environmental 
degradation continues (e.g., Stokey (1998)) and others who see uninterrupted 
                                                 
2 See, e.g., “The Symposium on the Economics of Exhaustible Resources” in the Review of Economic 
Studies 1974, Vol 41 pp. 1-152. 
3 See Smulders (2006) for a discussion of these issues. 
4 See John and Pecchenino (1994) for an infinite horizon economy with environment quality but agents 
with shorter life spans. See also  Uzawa (2001) for an attempt that is very restrictive, possibly misleading. 
  2growth (e.g., Hartman and O-S Kwon (2005))—the latter, of course, have to 
assume that pollution ultimately is reduced below the level that the earth’s 
absorptive capacity can handle. Whatever the theoretical and empirical 
imponderables, one still hopes that there are flows (i.e., production and 
consumption of goods), which we can identify as helping or hindering the cause 
of sustainability. The development process of the currently rich countries—the 
North--was very “dirty” i.e., destructive of the world’s environment. A duplication 
by the South of that path of industrialization is clearly not feasible—a view that is 
widely, but not universally, held.   
  
This paper is concerned with the issues of development and trade and capital 
movements between the North and the South. In particular, how these 
interactions are affected by the environmental regulations in the North and how 
the trade and capital flows (or the threat of these) affect environmental policy. I 
will outline these issues in a neoclassical framework and my discussion of 
general issues relating to environment and international trade will be brief, since 
these are discussed elsewhere e.g., van Beers (2006). But before I turn to the 
North-South interactions, I want, by way of preliminary, to discuss one question 
that has played a prominent role in the growth, trade and environment debate: 
How does economic development affect the environment?  
 
The relation between economic development and the environment is a complex 
one. As mentioned above, the richer countries (the North) have industrialized in a 
very dirty manner primarily because the environmental consequences of growth 
were not an issue at that time. Over time, their production techniques have 
become cleaner. A concept that has received a lot of attention recently is the so-
called Environmental Kuznets Curve (EKC).
5 This tries to relate the emission of 
various pollutants to the GNP per capita of a country. It started off as a cross-
section exercise but its predictions also have time series implications.  
                                                 
5 See Grossman and Krueger (1995) for the original contribution, Andreoni and Levinson (2001) for a 
theoretical model and Dasgupta et al. (2002) for a survey.  
  3  
The EKC is the empirical observation that a lot of pollutants have turning points 
with respect to income levels per capita. Examples of these are sulphur dioxide, 
oxides of nitrogen, water pollutants, suspended particulate matter (SPM) etc. 
Grossman and Kruger(1995) find SPM and SO
2 have a turning point at $ 5000 
per capita (1985 US $), while Selden and Song (1994) note aggregate pollution 
of these come down at a much later stage of development. On the other hand, 
carbon emissions and solid waste do not have any turning points at all.
6 As will 
be discussed below, the latter class of pollutants can pose serious challenges to 
the development process of the South, and possibly of the world as a whole, 
because it is the accumulated stock of these pollutants (as opposed to the flow in 
any time period) that causes concern. Without going too much into the details of 
the process at work, one may hazard a guess that as society becomes richer 
some types of pollution may be easily tackled (and policies to tackle these are 
put into place because firms and individuals in isolation have the incentive to 
correct these “externalities”). But for other pollutants the cost of clean-up may be 
very high (as for carbon emissions). One issue that is not addressed by the EKC
7 
is the time frame taken to achieve the increase in GNP per capita. For instance 
Japan grew at an average annual rate of 8.07 between 1955 and 1973. This 
implies that because Japan was a latecomer to the development process it had 
access to cleaner technologies (compared to the early industrializers like the UK) 
but it was also compressing into two decades what the UK might have taken a 
hundred years to achieve.  
  
 
AN OVERVIEW OF NORTH-SOUTH ECONOMIC INTERACTIONS  
  
As should be evident from the discussion the introduction, even in the short run 
the word “environment” is too all-encompassing, especially in the context of the 
North–South divide. The South’s major concern under the heading of 
                                                 
6 For instance, per capita consumption of polythene rose from 2 kilograms annually to 4.5 kilograms 
between 1980 and 2005 and shows no signs of tapering off, 
  4environment is a requirement for population control, access to clean water, land 
which is not degraded, etc. Northern concerns are primarily with pollution—how 
the South’s production activity affects the pollution content of their exports--and 
the level of harmful atmospheric gases and the effects on sinks for those gases, 
such as tropical forests. The interface between international trade theory and 
environmental economics also focuses its attention primarily on these issues.  
 
Any discussion of North-South trade in an environmental context presumes that 
the South is better endowed with the environmental “input”. It is also undoubtedly 
true that much of the world’s bio-diversity is located in the South, as is the stock 
of mineral deposits. But it is not true in all cases--the number of kilograms of 
effluents per US dollar of output vary enormously across countries and there are 
effluents e.g., for which Indonesian production is cleaner than the US.  When 
disaggregated by sectors the picture becomes even more hazy. For example, for 
air toxicity US textile production is much dirtier than that of Mexico---this is true 
even for plastics.   
 
Let us, however, follow the standard presumption and assume that the South is 
better endowed in “the” environmental input. It should therefore export goods that 
use the environment intensively. While the empirical evidence in favour of this is 
far from clear-cut, concerns have been raised (mainly in the North) that the South 
is deliberately exploiting its environmental resources to gain an unfair advantage 
in trade. There are also fears that the South’s actions are not “sustainable”.  
  
  Northern (labour and environmental) lobbies fear that as environmental 
standards are raised in the North, mobile factors of production will move to the 
South where the environmental standards are lax, and they want similar 
environmental standards to be adopted in the South. The evidence on foreign 
investment by multinationals does not support this hypothesis of lax 
environmental standards as a major determinant of these flows. The South views 
                                                                                                                                                 
7 It was, as mentioned above, initially a cross-sectional exercise. 
  5this, quite justifiably, as unwarranted protectionism—a form of non-tariff barriers.  
  
 
In matters of trade and capital flows, the North has the commanding heights of 
the world economy. A rough estimate indicates that the top 20 per cent of the 
world’s population gets about 80 per cent of the world GDP. Most relative prices 
in the international economy are determined in the North because of its share in 
total world wealth and its organized markets (there are exceptions though—oil 
prices being a good example of this). The South takes world prices and the 
North’s environmental policy stance as given. This implies that the South has to 
share the environmental agenda of the North.  
 
Broadly speaking, the post-war free trade system ushered in by GATT has 
benefited the South. Poor countries have used trade as an “engine” of growth. 
This is however not true for all the developing countries. For instance, contrary to 
intuition, in cross-country regressions on growth, natural resource endowments 
usually show up with a negative coefficient. Some of the natural resource rich 
economies have faced a secular terms of trade deterioration. Leaving these 
countries aside, over time, as parts of the South have industrialized, the 
developed countries have introduced other items in the GATT / WTO agenda—
e.g., trade in services, intellectual property rights etc. This signifies a move, 
implicitly, to cede manufacturing to the South. The South has misgivings about 
some of these new items but it is true that these are new issues that were not 
around when the original GATT agenda was formulated. In the Northern 
protectionist lobbies in the past low wages in the South was seen to be the main 
cause of the loss of industrial jobs in the North. Now with successive tightening of 
environmental standards in the North, low environmental standards in the South 
are also seen as causes for unemployment in the North—presumably even 
allowing for the increased activity due to cleaning up still involves a decline in 
employment in the North. Hence the call for “fair” (as opposed to “free”) trade and 
objections to the South’s (low) environmental (and labour) standards.  
  6  
The South has also benefited from FDI as the new machines create employment 
while embodying the latest technology. Historically, since colonial times FDI has 
been undertaken by the North in the South. But in earlier periods, these went into 
mining and other extractive sectors and hence were not a cause for concern 
among the organized labour in the North. But since decolonization, and 
especially since the rise of the newly industrialized countries in Asia, 
manufacturing activity has started to move in a big way to the South. There is a 
fear that environmental concerns in the North will raise costs of production there 
causing a shift in comparative advantage to the South where standards are more 
lax. And for certain activities it would be profitable to shut shop in the North and 
relocate to the South—the “pollution haven”. In addition, if FDI moves to locations 
with lower environmental standards, there could be a competitive lowering of 
standards in the countries of the South. If the North lowers its environmental 
standards in response to this, we have the so-called “race to the bottom”. Thus in 
this view trade exports jobs and investment abroad only makes this more 
irreversible. There are those who are opposed to this view and point out that 
multinational corporations provide the latest technology and work practices in 
their plants located in the South. The evidence, reviewed briefly in the next 
section, on this issue suggests that in the past multinationals’ environmental 
standards in the plants in the South were considerably lower than in the North. It 
is possible that in more recent times there is a tightening of standards as 
environmental practices of multinationals are subject to greater scrutiny in the 
North.  
  
For about two centuries economists have used use the concept of comparative 
advantage to explain the pattern of production and trade in the world. In a 
simplified two-country two-commodity framework this simply boils down to 
asking: which is the commodity that the country produces at lowest cost (in 
relative terms). This, however, does not guarantee that the good will be exported. 
For this we require not only that preferences be identical but also homothetic 
  7(i.e., when faced with the same (relative) prices, all individuals consume all the 
goods in the same proportion—this rules out the case where the wealthy are 
more environment-conscious). Without identical homothetic preferences, tastes, 
by themselves, could constitute the explanation of trade.
8 As is well-known, there 
are two major theories of international trade viz. the Ricardian theory and the 
Heckscher-Ohlin theory. The former emphasizes differences in technologies to 
explain comparative advantage while the latter relies on relative factor 
abundance. In the last thirty years a third explanation—the “new” theory—has 
emerged. It relies on market structure and increasing returns to explain the 
pattern of trade.  
  
We saw above that in the environmental economics literature, “the” environment 
is treated as a factor of production. This begs the question of how do we 
construct an aggregate for the environment. It is a shortcut for a more long-
winded statement viz. that production pollutes, and hence pollution is an output 
jointly produced with the final good and a reduction of pollution (for a given level 
of output)-- abatement-- is costly. But what is the “true” price of this input? It is 
whatever the society thinks it is worth. But that, in turn, depends on preferences. 
For instance, a society, which values the environment more, would be willing to 
sacrifice more of other goods for this. Clearly taste differences are very important 
here. Also, presumably the pollution input is variable, so its endowment is 
endogenous and changes over time—see the discussion on sustainability in the 
Introduction.  
  
Thus, poorer countries may tend to put a lower value on a clean environment and 
hence are considered to have a large endowment of pollution intensive goods. 
For example, Japan has a very large forest cover but imports logs from South 
East Asia. Similarly a poor country would probably deplete (even exhaust) its 
                                                 
8 In equilibrium, of course, we just need that preferences are not strong enough to offset the production 
advantage. Thus identical homothetic tastes seem overly restrictive. But starting of from a decentralized 
set-up (i.e., where households and firms plan separately), identical homothetic preferences will always 
ensure that preferences do not constitute the cause of trade.  
  8natural resource base at a rate higher than if it were richer. It is this kind 
reasoning that led the then Vice President of the World Bank, Larry Summers to 
suggest that industrial waste should be shipped from the North to the South—the 
South does not have a technological or ecological superiority when it comes to 
absorbing waste but today is poorer relative to the North.  
  
POLICY ISSUES IN NORTH-SOUTH TRADE AND INVESTMENT  
  
Preferences, Environment and Trade Policy  
  
Four (possibly five) channels that link international trade and the environment are 
identified in the literature—two of them familiar from the standard trade theories. 
First, in line with the international trade theory, depending on a country’s 
comparative advantage there is a composition effect—who will produce what and 
how much?  In a closed economy all the demand has to be met by domestic 
production—trade allows a country to specialize. Second, trade may impose 
restrictions on the technique of production—in the simple Heckscher-Ohlin model 
with trade and incomplete specialization in production, the techniques are 
identical across countries. Third, international trade raises world incomes, which, 
in turn, changes the scale of production. What are the consequences of this 
change in scale on the environment? Especially if environmental taxes were not 
at their “Pigovian” level (i.e., equating the tax with the marginal damage pollution 
causes to society) to start off with. And finally, as trade raises incomes, people 
have a higher willingness to pay for a clean environment. A possible fifth channel 
is something not present in competitive models—as trade raises incomes, a 
larger market enables cleaner and more expensive technologies (with higher 
fixed costs) to be introduced. 
9
 
In a series of papers, Copeland and Taylor (1994), (1995) have analyzed the 
interaction between trade and the environment assuming that governments 
                                                 
9 In Ghosh and Sen (2006) this idea is pursued and they show that in the short run, following a 
liberalization of trade with given technologies, pollution rises. As incomes rise better technology can be put 
installed—this accords well with the historical experience of Japan and Korea.  
  9always set taxes at the Pigovian levels.
10 These papers look at differences in 
pollution standards with policy evolving endogenously with incomes. Countries 
are assumed to have identical factor endowments. In the first of these papers 
they look at a model of the world economy where pollution is local and the North 
sets a higher environmental standard. This has a composition effect, causing the 
polluting industry to contract in the North and expand in the South. As incomes 
rise in the South, the willingness to pay for a cleaner environment also rises--this 
means income effects, discussed in the previous section, are important--but the 
usually the composition effect dominates and the South ends up with a higher 
level of pollution, while in the North pollution declines.    
 
In Copeland and Taylor (1995), on the other hand, all pollution is global, and 
increased trade relocates production from the North to the South, leaving world 
pollution unaffected—the South gains and the North loses from free trade due to 
the existence of a “pollution haven”. Moreover if a free trade agreement were to 
freeze pollution at the autarky levels, then the North gains and the South loses. 
This possibly explains why the North (or lobbies within it) wants to link the 
environment to trade and the South opposes such a move.   
  
Given that trade policy has effects on the scale, technique and composition of 
output, a question that arises is whether trade policy (via a tariff or a quantitative 
restriction) should be used to correct an environmental distortion? The answer 
from international trade theory is, in general, “no”. If the environmental distortion 
is the only departure from a competitive structure, then the best policy (called the 
“first-best policy”) is to tackle the pollution at its source—through a Pigovian tax.
11 
Trade policy can at best be a second-best solution. This is not an arcane 
theoretical issue in the North-South context. By granting other nations the “Most-
                                                                                                                                                 
 
10 See also Antweiler et al. (2001). 
11 This is true in very simple models. A departure from the Pigovian level is called for when, for instance, 
there is double moral hazard (see Aggarwal and Lichtenberg (2005) or there is a cost of verifying the state 
(see Cremer and Gavahri (2002). 
  10Favoured-Nation” status under GATT-WTO, the North has surrendered its 
market power. It could levy the equivalent of an optimal tariff by imposing 
environmental taxes, which raise tax revenue and deteriorate the South’s terms 
of trade. The North could get a “double dividend” if the terms of trade advantage 
and the tax revenue by lowering other distortionary taxes more than makes up for 
the direct contractionary effect of the environmental taxes—see Sen and 
Smulders (2000) for a model of this phenomenon.  
  
   
One form of North-South interaction that is becoming very important and requires 
a different set of analytical tools is the protection of the so-called “global 
commons”--see Finus (2006) for a summary of the arguments.
12 If the global 
commons is viewed as a public good, then free trade is no longer optimal and 
trade policy may not be the optimal response to the problem. Matters are further 
complicated by the fact that the environmental effect on these commons can take 
a very long time to manifest themselves. For instance, overfishing in oceans may 
cause the disappearance of the fish stock only gradually over time. The 
disappearance of the ozone layer due to the build up of greenhouse gases 
(GHGs) and CFCs is a better-known example. The scientific evidence on the 
greenhouse gases and their effect on global-warming is not precise but it 
suggests that though the problem currently is not serious, it will become so if the 
carbon emissions continue unchecked. Thus the flow of carbon emissions into 
the atmosphere accumulates, subject to some absorptive capacity of the 
atmosphere, and it is the stock of the greenhouse gases that deplete the ozone 
layer. As with overfishing, these processes are subject to irreversibilities—
mankind cannot make the ozone hole, once made, disappear through 
responsible behaviour. But at present, action can be taken to prevent the hole 
from getting larger.  
 
Our discussion above of the EKC assumed that various emissions had turning 
  11points because richer countries cared more about the environment—of course, 
for various pollutants these turning points are different. This is no longer true if 
the receptacle of emissions is the earth’s atmosphere. Here no individual nation 
has an incentive to spend on cleaning up—a classic case of free riding and 
under-subscription of the public good.  
  
Three facts about carbon emissions should be kept in mind. First, emissions per 
capita in developed countries are about 25 times as high as in developing 
countries.  Second, the US, China and Russia account for over 50 per cent of the 
world’s emissions. Third, carbon emissions per $ of GNP produced is much 
higher in developing countries than in the developed countries—this implies that 
their energy conversion is inefficient.  
  
On the empirical side, Whalley (1991) reports some CGE based results on inter-
country effects of a carbon tax in a three-bloc (static) model—the blocs being oil 
exporters, oil-importing developed and developing countries. Three kinds of 
policies are examined—a national production-based tax, a national consumption-
based tax and a global tax with revenues being rebated on a per capita basis. As 
would be expected, developed countries lose less from a consumption-based tax 
(since they get to keep the revenue) than from a global tax. For the developing 
countries the ranking is opposite of this—in fact, they actually gain from a global 
tax. The oil-exporters prefer the production tax, since they get to keep the 
revenue. Thus both the incidence of taxes and the distribution of tradable permits 
are important here.  
  
There are two aspects of international environmental agreements (IEAs) of 
interest to us. First, these treaties usually involve carrots (in the form of transfers 
for members who might lose from participating in the treaty)
13 and sticks 
(providing some punishments for non-compliance). It is interesting to note, en 
                                                                                                                                                 
12 See the discussion of Copeland and Taylor (1995) above. 
13 See Carraro et al. (2005) for a discussion of the role of transfers and its neglect in the theoretical 
  12passant, that there are some purely voluntary IEAs also. For instance, the Sofia 
Protocol of 1988 on controlling emissions of nitrogen oxide has been successful 
in reducing emissions of these gases by 2.1 per cent in the period up to 1996 
(see Bratberg et al. (2005) )—a fact that is important since most analysts believe 




The second aspect of these agreements worth commenting on is regarding the 
modelling strategy adopted. Each country is assumed to be a closed economy 
but for the transboundary consequences of the emissions of greenhouse 
gases.
15 This misses an important channel alluded to above viz. terms of trade 
changes. For instance, Carraro et al. (2005) allow different potential signatories 
in the IEA to differ in terms of marginal damage and marginal costs of 
abatement—this actually leads, in their analysis to some players being more 
crucial to coalition-building to reduce GHGs than others. But primary goods 
producers are “upstream” agents and if the demand for their product from abroad 
falls, they suffer a terms of trade loss.   
  
On this issue, a recent paper by Copland and Taylor (2005) set the cat among 
the pigeons by showing that in a trading, as opposed to a closed economy, 
framework some conventional results get overturned. For instance trade in 
emission permits may not be necessary for equalization of marginal abatement 
costs.  
  
Property Rights and Trade  
  
A different literature identifies North-South trade in terms of different institutions 
of property rights. As an economy gets integrated into a market system, 
traditional collective (community) ownership of “the commons” breaks down. 
                                                                                                                                                 
literature.   
14 See Murdoch and Sandler (1997) for such a view on the Montreal Protocol of 1987 that had been 
otherwise thought of as a successful IEA.    
15 See Nordhaus (1993) for a summary of such an approach.  
  13Migration takes place and a sense of community disappears. Property rights 
previously vested in the community become ill-defined. Examples of this abound-
-forestry, rivers, oceans etc. Free riding becomes possible in this scenario-- one 
may extract from the commons without penalty or deterrence. Much has been 
written on the question of overharvesting by the trawlers of fish stocks on the 
Atlantic Coast off Canada and also the conflict it often gives rise to between 
traditional fishermen, as in the case of the trawlers from EC countries off the 
coast of Senegal.  
 
In the South, apart from a breakdown of traditional forms of communal 
ownership, there is a problem of widespread corruption and weak law 
enforcement. In this situation, state-owned land is often treated as a common 
access regime—forests, game parks (sometimes even government-owned 
financial institutions function like an open access regime!) etc. are examples of 
these. In such a situation it is not clear that the traditional cure for market failure--
-government intervention---improves things. We have to trade off government (or 
policy) failure against market failure.   
  
The first paper to highlight the effects of property rights on trade was Chichilinsky 
(1994). She started off by assuming that in a North-South trade model there is no 
difference between these blocs in terms of endowments. The difference lies in 
the property rights-- the North has well-defined property rights and the South has 
an open access regime. An open access regime leads to an over-harvesting of 
the environmental resource in response to current prices. Additionally, since 
appropriation of returns is a problem, there is no incentive to manage the 
resource in an optimal way from a dynamic viewpoint-- this leads to 
disappearance of fish stocks, forests etc.  
  
Given an open access regime in the South the environmental resource is over-
harvested and the South shows an “apparent” abundance of the environmental 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
  14resource. If tastes are identical and homothetic, in autarky the price of the 
environmental good will be lower in the South. Free trade will cause the North to 
import the environment-intensive good from the South, thus exacerbating the 
overexploitation of resources. These give rise to “apparent gains from trade.” 
Trade is actually welfare-reducing (a competitive equilibrium does not represent 
the scarcity values to society) but without looking at the cause of factor 
abundance, it does not appear to be so. Similarly, one can see that if the natural 
resource were exhaustible, it would be exhausted faster than would be the case 
if the property rights were well-defined. In Brander and Taylor (1997) and (1998), 
it is shown that in such a set-up, a tariff can improve welfare—it corrects the 
absence of property rights.
16   
  
There is evidence in favour of this. Consider the imports of logs by Japan. Japan, 
after an initial burst of depletion of its own natural resources, has been very 
protective of its own forest cover and has imported logs from Indonesia and 
Malaysia. In these countries—where property rights are not always well-defined-- 
there has been widespread depletion of tropical forests, with concerns elsewhere 
in the world about the disappearance of “the global commons”. While logging 
may be a labour-intensive activity, stricter regulation in Japan and the property 
rights regime in the exporting country are also important in depleting the forest 
cover.  
 
Models of Capital Flows  
  
There are few theoretical (and empirical) studies that address the issue of FDI.,. 
Traditional FDI models were about locational advantage which had to be availed 
of in a particular place. One example of this was the tariff-jumping theory of 
FDI—the host country had a market that could be provided for cheaply by 
locating production there, otherwise a tariff had to be paid. Recent FDI models 
have talked about horizontal FDI—i.e., the production of some brands a product 
                                                 
16 Smulders et al. (2004) caution us about trade restrictions being necessarily good for bio-diversity in the 
Brander and Taylor set-up. Trade restrictions could lead to an expansion of agriculture which, over time, 
  15move to the South. There is a counterpart in the environmental literature, when 
production is not so much attracted to the South by its regulations but is repelled 
from the North through the tight environmental regulations there. As an example 
consider the following: Both the North and the South have some capital and 
some polluting inputs and produce a homogeneous good. Both inputs are 
footloose in that they respond to price changes but only capital moves 
internationally. If capital movement is allowed, capital moves from the capital-rich 
North to the environment-rich South. This brings the environment-capital ratios 
together. In an integrated world—i.e., when capital yields the same rate of return 
everywhere--a tightening of environmental standards causes capital to flow out 
and FDI may actually increase pollution in the recipient country.  
  
A more recent type of model for FDI concerns vertical FDI where some parts of a 
production process is fragmented and moved to the South because of its lower 
labour costs. There is no reason why these costs cannot be environmental costs 
(see Markusen et al. (2001)).  
  
A different kind of capital movement that has become important in the last few 
years is that of financial capital. For instance, the East and South-East Asian and 
Latin American economies have opened their capital accounts to financial flows, 
though in the wake of the Asian crisis capital flows to these countries had 
dropped significantly.  What is the relationship between the ability to borrow in 
the international capital markets and the environment? Consider the following 
example: Citing the poor human rights record of the Indonesian government, 
there have been calls for all capital flows to be cut off to that country. What would 
be the effects of these on the environment? If Indonesia viewed the Asian crisis 
as a temporary setback, it would try to borrow and smooth consumption. If all 
lending is cut off, then it may seek to find other ways to prevent a sharp drop in 
its consumption. It may choose to cut down parts of its remaining forests that the 
rest of the world believes plays a role in acting as a sink for GHGs. Higher 
                                                                                                                                                 
leads to a destruction of habitats. 
  16consumption could be polluting but may be better in terms of protecting these 
sinks. This simple example shows how access to international capital market 
may allow poor countries to borrow against higher future income and relieve 
some pressure on the (global) environment.   
  
SOME EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE  
  
In this section I shall review some of the empirical evidence. I shall endeavour to 
cover the evidence on: (a) Heckscher-Ohlin type models—most of the empirical 
literature focuses on this, (b) on foreign investments and the pollution-haven 
hypothesis, and (c) environmental consequences of agricultural exports.   
  
Empirical Evidence on Environmental Costs and Trade  
  
Do higher environment standards raise costs of production within an economy? 
There are studies that find environmental costs do impact on industrial 
production patterns e.g., these costs show up in new investment of the chemical 
industry across USA. Do these effects of environmental standards on costs show 
up in the pattern of international trade?   
  
The results are mixed. Studies such as Lee and Roland-Holst (2001) report in a 
study involving trade between Indonesia and Japan, an “increase in relative 
output share of dirty industries causing higher pollution intensities for almost all 
major product categories” following liberalization of trade. Over time however, 
Indonesia's pollution intensity in the traded goods does come down.
17 Antweiler 
et al (2001), on the other hand, find evidence for sulphur dioxide emissions going 
down after trade liberalization.
18  It would be fair to say that the effect of 
environmental costs on trade patterns is not strong. The poorer countries have 
had a higher growth rate of dirty industries in the 1970’s and 1980’s subsequent 
to the tightening of environment standards in the North. Indeed the share of dirty 
industries has increased for a few developing countries and for the developed 
                                                 
17 This is consistent with the theoretical model of Ghosh and Sen (2006). 
18 It is a pollutant that is relatively easy to abate through the use of scrubbers.  Its disutility is also very 
  17countries it has declined. This evidence is not direct proof of the existence of any 
“pollution havens”, because during this period the developing countries grew (in 
terms of GDP) significantly faster than the developed countries. It is still the case 
that most of the dirty goods production is still in the North!  
  
Why is the effect of environmental costs not more pronounced in the international 
trade data? Three reasons have been suggested for this apparent anomaly. First, 
trade accounts for a relatively small share of world production. Second, a large 
share of trade involves trade in environmentally clean goods. And finally, even for 
dirty goods, abatement costs account for a relatively modest share of total costs.  
  
What is true of data on international trade is also true of macroeconomic (i.e., 
computable general equilibrium) models. For instance, the effect on welfare of 
fairly large decreases in carbon emissions are modest— emissions cuts rising to 
40 per cent by 2050 never exceed 1.5 per cent of GDP except for Japan. This 
cutback is expected to have a substantial ‘leakage’ (i.e. increases elsewhere) 
effects –as high as 70 per cent. This is caused by a decline in world demand for 
energy, which makes non-EC economies use more of it. It is possible that the 
small welfare effects are due to the models being competitive, full employment 
models. If, on the other hand, there was strategic interaction between firms, there 
could be relocation of plants after a threshold, and hence the effects of emission 
regulation and how these are achieved could be substantial.
19
  
A different way of looking at the relationship between trade and the environment 
is to look at the experience of economies which have relied on a trade-led 
growth, e.g., Japan and the East Asian economies. Looking at Korea one finds 
during the 1960’s, and even as late as the early 1990’s, environmental policies 
were almost absent. This led to an industrial structure which was very intensive 
in energy and materials, although Korea had very little of either. The export share 
                                                                                                                                                 
clear—it irritates the eyes. Hence it is a pollutant whose removal is a priority as incomes rise. 
19 Markusen et al. (2001) find that under a non-competitive set up these costs can be substantial. 
  18in output in the mid-1980’s was about 30 per cent but it generated 30 to 50 per 
cent of waste (pollutants, solid waste etc.). Japan similarly had a very poor 
environmental record in the early post-war years but in recent times Japan has 
reduced its environment-intensive exports significantly--except for steel. Similarly 
it is expected that the effect of Chinese growth will cause a rise in total pollution 
as China moves its employment from agriculture to light industry—this is the third 
channel mentioned at the beginning of the previous section. The pollution 
intensity of agriculture, which will become less labour-intensive as labour is 
sucked out of agriculture, will also rise.  
  
Finally, it is important to remember that there are products whose production is 
banned in the North, but continue to be manufactured and/or sold in the South—
the South is completely specialized in the production of these. Asbestos is a 
product that continues to be sold in the South without adequate warning. In early 
2006 a French warship, Clemenceau, was send to an Indian port for stripping but 
was sent back after a furore over the unknown quantity of asbestos it was 
carrying. DDT, a pesticide, is another health hazard whose production in the 
South has not ceased.  
 
Evidence on FDI  
.   
The evidence on the environmental consequences of FDI is sketchy (as was the 
theory). Most of the empirical work deals with relocation within the North.  
  
Overall, for most commodities in recent times, it would be fair to say that low 
environmental costs are also not a major cause in deciding on location—e.g., 
Javorcik and Wei (2004) have done a thorough study of investment decisions in 
the former Soviet Union and the Eastern European countries and decisively 
reject the pollution haven hypothesis.  Law and order would probably be as 
important. Also if the good was meant for export then the environmental 
consciousness in the export market is also a consideration—indeed this has 
brought to the fore the issue of the North “dictating” the production processes in 
  19the South. But there are industries for which the environmental regulation could 
be a major factor. It has been found that between 1973 and 1985 overall FDI by 
the US chemical and mineral industry increased at a rate faster than overall FDI 
by the US. Sulphur emissions allowed in the host country, is seen to be an 
important locational choice variable for the US chemical industry.  
  
Researchers have found a favourable effect of trade and FDI taken together on 
the environment. Among the countries of the South, countries with an outward-
orientation have cleaner technology than inward-looking import-substituting ones. 
Market pressure causes rapid obsolescence and import of capital goods leads to 
the acquisition of the latest technology. This is broadly consistent with the 
discussion above where a country in the South that is open to foreign capital 
flows is forced to move its techniques in tandem with what is happening in the 
North. The post-war historical experience of Japan, with its dependence on trade 
and a very fast rate of technical progress also bears this out.  
  
Turning to the historical experience, FDI in Korea was pollution-intensive in the 
early stages of industrialization. This included heavy investments in 
petrochemicals, chemicals and metallurgy. It is only later that less polluting 
electronics etc. were added to the list.  
 
One of the biggest environmental disasters involved the US multinational Union 
Carbide. In 1984, a gas (methylisocynate) leak, in its plant in Bhopal, India, killed 
between 2000 and 5000 people and over 80,000 people had their lungs 
permanently damaged. The Union Carbide plant in Bhopal had lower standards 
than its plant in West Virginia USA, where such an accident was unlikely to 
occur.  
  
Another example of lax standards was Mitsubishi’s chemical plants in Malaysia. 
These used to dispose of radioactive thorium waste in plastic bags—this was 
admitted only under legal pressure.  
  20  
Agricultural Exports and the Environment  
  
Turning to agriculture, we can divide the transformation in agriculture due to a 
change in practices as (a) changes in eco-systems i.e., loss of bio-diversity, (b) 
changes in natural endowments e.g., pollution, soil deterioration, and (c) loss of 
sustainability.  Damage could be on-site e.g., land erosion, damage to farmers 
from pesticides, or it could be off-site e.g., water contamination, acid deposition 
from ammonia emissions.  
  
Three examples of changes in agricultural practices in the South in response to a 
rise in export demand are given here. Export demand for cassava grew for 
intensive pig farming in the Netherlands. This was because root crops had their 
tariffs lowered in the GATT rounds in the 1960s (as opposed to cereals). 
Thailand and Indonesia responded to the increased demand for cassava. The 
fragile upland soils of Java and forest lands in the Outer Islands came under 
monocropping of cassava--similarly in Thailand forest land in north-east Thailand 
declined by about 50 per cent. When the export boom ended, the land growing 
cassava was found to be extremely degraded.   
  
Similarly the demand for grain production especially soya bean caused a 
conversion of large areas of the Argentine pampas with increased use of 
chemical fertilizer and a scrapping of the traditional crop rotating practice. Soil 
erosion in the new crop areas were often 65 per cent more than with the 
traditional crop rotating practice.  
  
Shrimp cultivation in Ecuador (and Honduras) for export to the US and Japan 
resulted in transforming the mangrove areas into pools for shrimp farming. This 
resulted in high shrimp yields initially but then yields have fallen sharply due to 
the destruction of the mangroves.  
  
Finally, some authors have argued that a liberalization of world agricultural 
  21trade—the Northern agriculture receives subsidies and protection—would make 
Southern incomes rise and the world would move away from environmentally 
unfriendly (chemical fertilizers and sprays) to labour-intensive sustainable 
methods. One must approach these conjectures with caution because we are 
talking of non-marginal changes here. Producer subsidy equivalent (PSE) in 
1993 was 42 per cent of the value of OECD agricultural output. It would involve 
major changes in employment patterns, demand for fuel etc. all over the world. 
Similarly, as the three examples above show, an increase in Southern 






In this paper we first reviewed the literature on environmental degradation and 
growth. Then we looked at environmental linkages between the North and the 
South--these links have come to occupy the centre-stage in international 
negotiations on trade liberalization. Notions of comparative advantage seem to 
suggest that the availability of environmental inputs should have implications for 
location of production and/or trade. Since the South has environmental 
regulations that are relatively lax, it has a comparative advantage in environment-
intensive goods. A tightening of environmental regulation in the North would 
reinforce this.  
  
The data, if at all, lend only very limited support to this hypothesis. This is 
possibly due to the fact that the environmental costs are a very small proportion 
of total costs. Other considerations, including environmental consciousness in 
the export market, are possibly more important. Similarly, in the decision to invest 
abroad, environment considerations though they may be present are not 
paramount.  
                                                 
20 See Smulders et al. (2004) for a model where agricultural expansion is bad for bio-diversity.  
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